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 Employment relations—which form most of the 20th century was called industrial 
relations, and what some now call human resources and industrial relations—is a 
multidisciplinary field studying all aspects of work and the employment relationship (Ackers and 
Wilkinson, 2003; Budd, 2004; Kaufm an, 2004). A multidisciplinary approach means that 
competing values and assum ptions underlie the an alyses, policies, and practices of employm ent 
relations scholars, practition ers, and policymakers. Unfortunately, these underly ing beliefs are 
often implicit rather than expl icit, or, with the longstanding focus on how industrial relations 
processes work, sometimes ignored altogether. But understanding the em ployment relationship, 
corporate human resource management practices, labor union strategies, and work-related public 
policies and laws requires understanding how values and assum ptions form the ideologies and 
frames of reference used by scholars, practitioners, and policymakers.  
 According to Kochan and Katz, “The prim ary thread running through industrial relations 
research and policy prescriptions is that labor is more than a commodity…and more than a set of 
human resources” and “a critical assumption underlying industrial relations research is that there 
is an inherent conflict of interest between employees and employers” that comes from a “clash of 
economic interests” (1988: 6). From this perspective, labor unions and government policies such 
as minimum wage laws are seen as socially be neficial because they can m oderate the unequal 
bargaining power betw een employees and empl oyers. This passage, therefore, is a good 
illustration of the importance of underlying values and assumptions in employment relations. At 
the same time, it only describes one perspective (t he pluralist perspective). In contrast, labor 
unions and governm ent regulations are seen as detrimental when one assum es that perfectly 
competitive labor markets are optimal (an egois t perspective), as unnecessary when em ployers 
and employees are viewed as always having comm on interests (a unitarist perspective), and as 
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insufficient when one sees the em ployment relationship as an unequal power relation e mbedded 
in greater social and political inequalities (a critical perspective). These four views of unions and 
government regulation—harmful, unnecessary, socially beneficial, and  insufficient—are firmly 
rooted in four different theories on the employment relationship that embody different values and 
assumptions (Budd, 2005). 
 These four key theories  are the eg oist, unitarist, pluralist, and cr itical models of the  
employment relationship.1 They serve as the central ideo logies and fram es of reference for 
scholars, practitioners, and policymakers who deal with all aspects of work. These ideologies and 
frames of r eference are packages of values and assumptions pertaining to the interests of  the 
parties to the employment relationship—that is, the needs, wants, and aspirations of em ployees, 
employers, and the sta te—and the degree to w hich these interests are compatible. Outlining the 
important conceptualizations of these interests is therefore a m ajor part of this chapter. The 
section that follows this discussion considers the different assumptions about the compatibility of 
these interests and inte grates this analys is with a description of the four key theories. The 
importance of these values, assum ptions, ideologies, and frames of reference are then explored. 
But first, these important concepts need to be defined.  
DEFINING CONCEPTS 
 Values, ideology, and fram e of reference ar e dangerous terms. Everyone has their own 
                                                 
1 The broad scope and concise length of this review precludes a deta iled examination of 
significant variations and details within the theories and perspectives outlined here. For example, 
Godard (1992: 244; 2005) includ es a fifth m odel based on a pl uralist economic and political 
system which is “far more egalitarian in opportunities and outcomes and which provides workers 
with far greater rights” than in what he term s the orthodox pluralist perspective. While these two 
views perhaps envision different refor ms and id eal institutions, th ey are roo ted in sim ilar 
assumptions and values so we consider them  as one model. The interested reader is referred to 
the references cited herein and to the othe r chapters of this Handbook for m ore nuanced 
discussions of various theories and perspectives.  
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view of what these terms m ean and it’s common to use these te rms without defining them. The 
term ideology is particularly problem atic in being used in m any different ways (e.g., see  
Eagleton, 1994). Figure 5.1 summarizes ou r definitions.2 At the center of our discussion are  
theories of the em ployment relationship—coherent models of how the employment relationship 
works. Each theory is built upon a collection of values and assumptions. Values are fundamental 
principles that ought to be true, such as the belief that labor s hould be treated as  more than a 
commodity. Assumptions are beliefs about human behavior and the nature of various institutions 
such as markets, laws, corporations, and unions that are presum ed to be true, such as the belief  
that there is an inherent conflict of interest in the em ployment relationship. Depending on how 
each theory is used, it can serve as an ideology or a frame of reference. 
 Thelen and Withall define fram e of re ference as a “concep tual structure of 
generalizations or contexts, postulates about what is essential, assumptions of what is valuable, 
attitudes about what is possible,  and ideas about what will work  effectively” in which eac h 
individual “perceives and inte rprets events” ”(1949: 159). Fox not es more sim ply that actors  
“perceive and define social phenomena” (1974: 271) through frames of reference. More recently, 
The Norton Dictionary of Modern Thought defines frame of reference as “the context, viewpoint, 
or set of presuppositions or of evaluative criteria within which a person’s perception and thinking 
seem always to occur, and which constrains selectively the course and outco me of these 
activities” (Bullock and Trombley, 1999: 334). In other words, a frame of reference “determines 
judgment, which in turn determ ines subsequent behavior” (Fox, 1966: 2). The them es of 
                                                 
2 It should be emphasized that Figure 5.1 is intended to capture our definitions; it is not presented 
as a theoretical model of the determinants of any of the components of the figure. The popularity 
of an ideology, for exam ple, might shape valu es and assum ptions. While it’s important to 
understand the determinants of dominant ideologies, such theoretical issues are beyond the scope 
of what Figure 5.1 is intended to portray. 
 5-4
perception, evaluation, and indiv idual action in these defin itions are central to our d efinition of 
frame of reference.3 More specifically, we defin e frame of reference as a theo ry used to gu ide 
and evaluate behaviors, outcom es, and institutions. To disti nguish ideology from  frame of 
reference, we adopt a definition of ideology that emphasizes public exposition rather than private 
evaluation. More specifically, we define ideology as  a theory that is used to advocate and justify 
behaviors, outcomes, and ins titutions. This is consis tent with The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy: “the most important usage [of ideology] in contemporary philosophy and politics” is 
as “a collection of beliefs and values held by an individual or group for other than purely 
epistemic reasons” (Honderich, 2005: 419) and with Fox’s (1966: 5)  “instrument of persuasion” 
function of ideology.4  
 In other words, a fram e of reference is how  one sees the world; an ideology is how one  
wants others to see the world. When a decline in union density troubles a policymaker because of 
a concern for protecting employees when employers have greater bargaining power, the pluralist 
model is being used as a fram e of reference. When business leaders deploy the egoist m odel of 
the employment relationship to call for deregulating labor law and to jus tify relocating jobs to 
low wage countries, this m odel is being used as an ideology (t he liberal m arket ideology). 
Admittedly, one’s ideology and frame of refere nce might involve the same underlying theory—
for example, a radical scholar m ight evaluate outcomes and advocate for reform s using a frame 
of reference and an ideology both based on a Marxist conception of the employment relationship. 
But our definitions allow for the possibility th at individuals preach from  one ideology while  
practicing another. In particular , an important belief in some sc hools of Marxist thought is that 
                                                 
3 These them es are also consistent with the construct of fra ming in psychology (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986) and collective action frames in sociology (Benford and Snow, 2000). 
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ideology serves as a false consciousness in which the dominant class uses ideology to disguise 
their control. Managerial statem ents emphasizing individualism, cooperation, and  competition 
are therefore seen as a strategy to  legitimize a hierarchical and unequal workplace and to 
promote the continued m anagerial control of work (Bendix, 1956;  Fox, 1966; Anthony, 1977;  
Kunda, 1992). A definition of ideology theref ore needs to distingu ish itself from fram e of 
reference and allow for the possibility that actors say one thing, but do another. At the same time, 
it is important to remember that ideologies and frames of reference draw upon the same theories 
of the employment relationship. It is to those theories that we now turn, starting with a discussion 
of the various assum ptions and values about th e interests of the part ies to the employm ent 
relationship.  
EMPLOYEE INTERESTS 
 Employees are obviously a critical part of the em ployment relationship. But what do 
employees want to get out of wo rk? Intellectually, how should we model employees as actors in 
the employment relationship (Kaufman, 1999)? Employees have diverse interests (C iulla 2000; 
Kelloway et al., 2004; Kelly 1998). But the four  theories of the employm ent relationship 
emphasize some interests over the others. It is therefore instructive to consider four categories of 
employee interests: survival and income; equity and voice; f ulfillment and social id entity; and 
power and control.  
Survival and Income 
 Most people need to work to survive. Our ancient ancestors used basic stone tools to 
butcher animals, cut firewood, and  build basic shelters as many as 2.5 m illion years ago. In 
modern societies, wage and salary incom e is the means to purchase the basic neces sities of life. 
                                                 
4 Definitions of ideology that em phasize assessment and understanding (e.g., Godard, 1995) are 
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In its most primal state, then, a worker’s interest is survival. This survival imperative is reflected 
in Maslow’s (1943) model of work m otivation based on a hierarchy of needs in which 
individuals are posited to first se ek the satisfaction of physiologi cal needs before pursuing other 
desires and is also reflected in W heeler’s (1985) model in which workpl ace conflict stems from 
the deprivation of necessary m aterial resources. Both Adam Smith (1776/2003) and Karl Marx 
(1844/1988) also hypothesized that wages for comm on laborers would fall to levels that just 
support subsistence so individuals end up working simply to survive. 
 In a m ore contemporary vein, one of the key foundations of m ainstream neoclassical 
economics is m odeling individuals as seeking to maximize their personal utility functions 
(Varian, 1984). Utility is generally seen as dependent on consumption which means that work is 
an activity tolerated by indivi duals to earn incom e to buy goods, services, and leisure 
(Killingsworth, 1983). As a purely incom e-earning activity, labor is vi ewed as any other 
commodity and is exchanged through im personal transactions as determ ined by supply and 
demand (Kaufman, 2005). At its core, then, neoc lassical economics equates employees’ interests 
to income; while not typically see n as m ere survival, the implications for the em ployment 
relationship are largely the same because the focal point of work is the self-interested acquisition 
of material or pecuniary benefits. 
Equity and Voice 
 An alternative conceptualization of employee interests is that em ployees not only want 
income, but also seek fairness. This is perhap s most simply demonstrated by organized labor’s 
longtime pursuit of “a fair day’s pay for a fair  day’s work.” Hum an resource m anagement 
scholars and industrial-organizatio nal psychologists also believe that fairness is a critical 
                                                 
frames of reference under our definitions. 
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dimension of employment. For example, Adams’s (1965) equity theory has been widely applied 
to employment issues. Most simply, workers are posited to reduce wo rk effort if they feel that 
they are working harder than others who are paid the sam e. More ge nerally, organizational 
justice—that is, employee perceptions of and reactions to fairness—has become a key construct 
in the human resource management and industrial-organizational psychology literatures (Folger 
and Cropanzano, 1998).  
 For others, the concern with fairness is root ed more in human dignity and liberty than in 
the behavioral sciences. The International Labor Organization’s (IL O) 1944 Declaration of 
Philadelphia, for example, asserts that 
All human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both 
their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom 
and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity. 
 
To this end, the ILO promotes labor standards pertaining to equal pay for equal work, reasonable 
working hours, periodic paid holidays, unem ployment and disability insurance, the right to form  
labor unions, and many other aspects of work. As human dignity is a critical theological concept, 
the Catholic Church through papal encyclicals such as Rerum Novarum and other major religions 
advocate similar standards and rein force fairness as an e mployee interest in the employm ent 
relationship (Budd, 20 04; Peccoud, 2004). E thical theories in the A ristotelian and Kantian 
traditions also support the im portance of respecting hum an dignity in the employm ent 
relationship (Bowie, 1999; B udd, 2004; Solomon, 1992). In fact, basic labor standards are 
increasingly argued to be human rights (Adams, 2001; Gross, 1998; Wheeler, 1994). 
 Such standards have traditionally been grouped together under a broad heading of equity 
(e.g., Barbash, 1987). More recen tly, Budd (2 004) articulates the key em ployee interests as 
equity and voice where equity is fair em ployment standards for both material outcomes (such as 
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wages and safety) and personal treatm ent (especially nondiscrimination) and voice is the ability 
to have meaningful input into decisions. A similar distinction in the research on justice in the  
behavioral sciences is between distributive and procedural justice—that is, between fairness in 
outcomes and in procedures (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998). Whether seen as equity and voice or 
as distributive and procedural justice, the im plication for employee interests is the s ame—
survival and income are too narrow  as the bas is of employee interests; rather, employees seek 
fairness not only in work-related outcomes, but also in how these outcomes are produced.  
Fulfillment and Social Identity 
Another view of employee interests is based on  the premise that individuals use work to 
provide psychological fulfillment and social identi ty. This is cle arly reflected in the larg e 
literature in psychology on work motivation that emphasizes intrinsic work rewards over pay and 
other extrinsic rewards (Donova n, 2001; Latham  and Pinder, 2005). Perhaps m ost famously, 
Maslow (1943) theorized that workers seek l ove, esteem, and self-actualization  after their 
physiological and security needs are m et. Thus, work provides employees with a basic outlet to 
channel their intrinsic motivation for achievement of desired o bjectives and personal 
fulfillment—or more simply, joy in work (De Man, 1929). A parallel stream of research in 
psychology examines the psychological importance of paid work. Building on Freud’s claim that 
man’s strongest link to reality is work, Ja hoda (1982) argues that em ployment provides 
psychological fulfillment by providing tim e structure boundaries, a wide r spectrum of social  
activities than those provided by family life, and involvement in a broader collective endeavor.  
Similar themes are echoed by theorists in ot her disciplines (Ciulla, 2000; Leidner, 2006; 
Muirhead, 2004). In fact, Karl Marx, Em ile Durkheim, and Max Weber all emphasize the 
importance of fulfillment through their concern with the loss of human dignity that accompanied 
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the denial of human fulfillment in the then-emerging modern employment relationship (Hodson, 
2001). For Marx (1844/1988), the defining feature of being human is freely working to create 
things, but under capitalism , workers do not cont rol the means of production and are therefore 
alienated from their labor, and denied their essential dignity as hum ans. Durkheim (1893/1933) 
sees the div ision of lab or as erodin g social norms and therefore allowing the exploitation of  
workers while Weber (1925/1978) sees the bureaucr acy of modern corporations as undermining 
dignity and fulfillment through the depersonalization of work. 
The importance of work for individual fulfillment and dignity is also believed to pro vide 
the foundation for the importance o f work for c reating social identities and spiritual fulfillment. 
To help define them selves and w here they fit in to society, people class ify themselves in 
occupational groupings (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1987;  Ashforth and Mael, 1989). In other words, 
work contributes to em ployees’ development of their se lf-concept by providing them with a 
social identity and thus another m eaning to their employment beyond that of pay. On a spiritual 
level, as famously articulated by Weber (1904/ 1976), the Protestant work ethic is based on 
Martin Luther’s concept of work as a “calling ” (serving God by doing g ood work in whatever 
occupation you are suited for) and molded by John Calvin into a belief that hard work is the path 
to salvation. In Islam , Buddhism, and Hinduism, work also serves a higher m otive that allows 
fulfillment of duty towards God such that individua ls’ interests in work are other  than solely  
economic (Ali, 1988; Schumacher, 1974; Nord, et al., 1990).  
Power and Control 
 A fourth perspective on em ployee interests is the belief  that workers seek power and 
control in the workplace. Recall from  the pr evious section that for Marx and som e other 
theorists, “labor in the sense of free productive activity is the essence of  human life” (Singer, 
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2000: 35). Meaningful work is th erefore seen as critical for fulfillment and dignity,  but under 
capitalism, workers are alienated because the product of their labor does not belong to them, they 
have no control over what is produced and how it is produced, and work becomes less of a social 
activity (Hodson, 2001; Ma rx, 1844/1988). To achieve dignity, a key worker interest is power: 
“the ability of an individual or group to contro l his (their) physical and social environm ent; and, 
as part of  this process,  the ability to inf luence the decisions which are and are not taken by 
others” (Hyman, 1975: 26). 
 Power and control can be pursued in various ways. Around the turn of the 20th century in 
the United States, craft unions developed work ru les pertaining to appren ticeship standards, 
ownership over specific job duties, exclusion of undesirable or unskilled job duties, work 
allocation procedures, and othe r standards (P erlman, 1928). These work rules were often 
established unilaterally by the unions and enforced by having m embers refuse to work on any  
other terms and by fining or expelling m embers who undermined these standards (Montgomery, 
1979). Today, some element of power and control are pursued by workers through various forms 
of solidarity and resistance (such as reduced work effort, absenteeism, and sabotage) (Edwards, 
1986; Hodson, 2001; Kelly, 1998). Political theories in  which capitalism is seen a s inferior to 
socialism or syndicalism are at least partly root ed in a perception that workers lack sufficient 
power and control in a capitalist society. In addition to class struggles between labor and capital, 
struggles for workplace power and  control can also take p lace along ge nder and racial lines 
(Amott and Matthaei, 1996; Delgado and Stefancic, 2001; Gottfried, 2006; Lustig, 2004). Lastly, 
employment relations theories that embrace employees’ interests in power and contro l are often 
derived from a belief that the primary employer interest is power and control over the workplace; 
this is discussed below.  
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EMPLOYER INTERESTS 
 One of the prim ary actors in th e modern employment relationship is the employer. It is 
typical to s ee the em ployer’s interests as  those of shareholders, execu tives, and m anagers, or 
alternatively as those of  the organization as a e ntity in its own right ( which might be peculia r 
except that U.S. law treats a co rporation as a person with its own rights and obligations). W e 
generally follow these approaches, but it should be noted that there is some danger in treating an 
employer as a monolithic entity. Executives or managers might have their own goals independent 
of those of the organization or the shareholders  which can lead to princ ipal-agent problems in 
which the agent does not always act in the bes t interests of the principal that hired him or her 
(Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). W hen we speak of the e mployer’s interests, we are  
referring to the organ ization’s interests which w ill also b e assumed to be consis tent with th e 
interests of the shareh olders, executives, and  managers. To the extent th at executives and 
managers are agents th at follow their self-interest rather than the organization ’s interests, the 
reader is referred back to the p revious section on employee interests. After all, executives  and 
managers are also em ployees in th e employment relationship—they are hired, fired, and are 
concerned with income, fulfillment, and the like. 
 In modeling the employment relationship, there are three prim ary views on the interests 
of employers. The first is profit  maximization—a firm’s objective is to structure work so as to 
generate the highest profit level possible to th e exclusive benefit of the firm’s owners. The 
second broadens the objective of profit m aximization to include consideration of other  
stakeholders such as employees. And the th ird is the pursuit of power and control ove r 
employees that goes beyond that n ecessary to maximize profits in some techn ical sense. In th e 
first conceptualization, profit maxim ization is seen as legitim ate. In the second  
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conceptualization, the pursuit of profits is legitimate when tempered by a respect for the interests 
of other stakeholders. In the thir d view, a prim acy of profits over other concerns is rejected as 
illegitimate.  
 Before turning to each of these conceptualizations, the reader is reminded to not confuse 
employer strategies with employer interests. In practice, we observe a multitude of  employment 
conditions ranging from abusive sweatshops to workplaces with generously-rewarded employees 
that have extensive decision-making authority. This does not mean that there are a large num ber 
of employer interests; rather, this diversity reflects a multitude of strategies for pursuing the three 
basic employer interests: profit m aximization, stakeholder value, or power and control. 
Moreover, these three interes ts are not intended  to simply capture how employers express their 
interests; rather we are also considering different ways of conceptualizing or modeling employer 
interests. Employers likely state that they are pursuing profits in a legitimate fashion or balancing 
the needs o f various stakeholde rs while rad ical scholars will s ee employers as pu rsuing their 
interests through a more critical lens. The discussion here is intended to cap ture this wide range  
of alternatives. 
Profit Maximization 
 In economic thought, firm s are assum ed to maximize profits (the difference between 
revenue and costs) (Varian, 1984). Different types of workers ar e hired up to the point at which 
hiring one more worker costs m ore than the revenue generated. There are differing views on the 
extent to which labor markets are competitive, to which transaction costs are important, and to 
which there are prin cipal-agent problems between workers and firm s because of asymm etric 
information (such as the firm  not being able to  perfectly observe worker effort),  but thes e 
complications do not change the basic foundation that each firm ’s objective is to m aximize 
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profits (Manning, 2003; W achter, 2004). The real-w orld importance of profit m aximization is 
reflected in the Anglo-Am erican shareholder model of corporate govern ance. In this sys tem, 
shareholders are res idual claimants and everyon e else is seen as receiving fixed paym ents for 
their services, such as wages and salaries. Sinc e shareholders single-handedly bear the risk of 
making a profit or loss, they are seen as the key group and economic performance will be 
optimized when corporate decisions m aximize shareholder value (B lair, 1995). Maxim izing 
profits and shareholder value therefore go hand in hand. 
  Many features of the modern em ployment relationship are linked to the profit motive. 
Frederick Winslow Taylor’s development of scie ntific management in the ear ly 20th century 
through carefully studying work tasks and scient ifically determining the one best way of 
completing a task can be seen as  driven by th e pursuit of greater e fficiency, and therefore 
profitability (Kanigel, 1997). As  articulated by Weber (1919/1946), the rise of the bureaucratic 
organizational form was a ration al solution to decision -making problems in the face of 
significant organizational com plexity (March and Simon, 1958). The bureaucratic form  of 
organization is ther efore geared towards the p rofit motive that is th e prime employer interest. 
The contemporary movement away from the narrowly-defined tasks of  Taylorism and the iron 
cage of Weber’s bureaucracy reflects an attem pt to boost profitability by creating more flexible  
employment practices (Applebaum and Batt, 1994). Layoffs, outsourcing, moving production to 
low-wage countries, and reducing employee benefits are also all done in the pursuit of enhancing 
profitability for the benefit of shareholders.  
Stakeholder Value 
Note carefully that the shareholder model of corporate governance assum es that labor 
markets are perfectly co mpetitive. As such, em ployees face little risk—if managers mismanage 
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the business and it goes bankrupt, the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets means 
that workers who lose their jobs  can alway s find equivalent jobs elsewhere at no cos t. 
Shareholders, however, lose their investment so the shareholder model holds managers liable for 
serving shareholder interests. But what if  labor m arkets are no t perfectly competitive?  
Employees invest their own hum an capital in a corporation and therefore, just like shareholders, 
make significant contributions and face risky returns (Blair, 1995). Employees might not be able 
to recoup their investm ent or costlessly find an equivalent job elsewhere if the business is 
mismanaged. As a result, stakeholder theory asse rts that all stakeholders—not only shareholders 
and owners, but also em ployees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and others—are  
sufficiently affected by corporate action s to dese rve the right to be considered in corporate 
decision-making. Stakeholder theory can also be rooted in propert y rights: even in the United 
States with strong restrictions against harm ing others, property rights are not unlimited, so, the 
argument goes, a corporation m ust take multiple interests into account (Donaldson and Preston,  
1995). In other words, a corpora tion does not exist just for the benefit of shareholders, and 
should be operated for the benefit of all those w ho have a stake in it. Supporters of stakeholder 
theory believe that shareholders  deserve a f air rate of return, but also th at the ideal of 
maximizing shareholder value without regard for other interests (as in the shareholder m odel) 
rests on questionable f oundations and should not be used to elevate the im portance of 
corporations over other stakeholders (Ghoshal, 2005). 
In this vein, then, the interest of employe rs in the em ployment relationship should be  
serving the interests of shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders. In the United States, 32 
states have constituency statutes in which com pany directors are explici tly allowed to consider 
interests beyond those of the shareholders  (Adams and Matheson, 2000). In Europe, 
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codetermination policies institutionalize stakeholder theory by requiring employee representation 
on corporate boards of directors while social norms in Japan also foster a concern for stakeholder 
value (Jacoby, 2001, 2005). 
Power and Control 
 For another set of employment relations scholars, characterizing the interest of employers 
simply as profit m aximization, or even as incr easing stakeholder value,  is too benign. Rather, 
employer interests are modeled as seeking pow er and control over labor. This dom inance serves 
not only to boost profits, but to prom ote capital accumulation, the am assing of wealth, and 
sociopolitical control (including, in the extreme, preventing a workers’ revolution) by the owners 
of capital.  
 For Marx, this dom inance is an in tegral feature of capitalism. As capitalis ts control the 
means of production, they are able to extract la bor’s surplus value which further em powers the 
capitalists at the expense of workers, not only in the economic arena, but in the sociopolitical  
realm as we ll. Rather than em ployers benignly seeking profit m aximization by competing for 
workers in neutral labor m arkets, employers are seen as controlling and dom inating labor 
through their superior econom ic and sociopo litical power (Hym an, 1975). In this vein, 
corporations are seen as  using their political clout to promote their own interests by obtaining 
government subsidies and contract s and by shaping legislation th at placates workers enough to 
avoid a broader working class threat while ch anneling labor conflict into tightly-regulated 
channels preferred by business rather than labor (e.g., witness the U.S. restrictions on secondary 
boycotts) (Domhoff, 1990).  
 In the workplace, the deskilling and division of labor that accom pany Taylorism are not 
seen as a win-win s ituation in which labor works m ore efficiently, but rather as m anagerial 
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strategies to decompose both skilled craft and cl erical occupations into simplified, routine, low-
skilled jobs in order to gain control over the workplace (Braverman, 1974; Montgomery, 1979). 
Bureaucracy is not seen sim ply as an effici ent structure for managing complexity; rather, 
bureaucracy is seen as a strategy  to routinize all aspects of m anagement and to consolidate the 
power to establish rules and pr ocedures in order to  control the o perations of an en tire 
organization (Edwards, 1979). More generally, labor  process theory em phasizes the importance 
of control mechanisms in the workplace (Thom pson and Newsome, 2004). In addition to issues 
of control along class (labor a nd capital) lines, control m ethods can also occur along gender, 
racial, and ethnic lines, such as with occupatio nal sex segregation (Greene, 2003). All of these  
are examples where employer interests are m odeled as power and control beyond that needed to 
benignly pursue profits. 
STATE INTERESTS 
The third major actor in the employment relationship is the state. The state has five roles 
in the em ployment relationship (G odard, 2005). In the regulative role, laws regulate workers, 
unions, and companies. In the em ployer role, the state is a public sector organization with its 
own employees. In the facilitativ e role, the state establishes so cial norms and provides support 
services for the em ployment relationship. The stru ctural role consists of econom ic policies that 
shape the econom ic environment. And in the cons titutive role, the stat e determines how the 
employment relationship is cons tituted by the ty pe of economic system embraced by the state 
(such as a m arket-based capitalist econom y). But what are the interests of the state in the 
employment relationship that determine how the stat e acts in these  five roles? In other words,  
what is the state trying to achieve? We present three broad alternatives: a focus on freedom and 
the rule of law, an interest in promoting equitable outcom es, and an objective to support the 
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domination of the elite.  As with the discuss ion of employer inte rests, these thre e interests are 
intended to capture different ways of conceptua lizing or modeling state interests; they do n ot 
simply describe how the state expresses its interests. 
 In all three conceptualizations of the state’s interests, it’s possible that the state does not 
have independent interests; rath er, its policies m ight simply mediate the political pressures of 
workers and employers in a pluralistic model or reflect and implement the political wishes of the 
dominant class in a Marxist m odel. For example, promoting freedom and the rule of law m ight 
be seen as an extension of e mployer interests, not an independent interest of the state. However, 
some research em phasizes the possi bility of autonom ous state action, especial ly as rooted in 
international connections of state officials, the need to maintain domestic stability, and the ability 
of government officials to use resources to  pursue their own ends (Skocpol, 1985). In 
employment relations circles, it  is widely be lieved that the anti-union policies of the Reagan 
administration and Thatcher government were more aggressive than would have been dictated if 
these administrations were simply reflecting bu siness lobbying. Either as  reflections or as 
independent interests, we believe the following three categories are instructive. 
Freedom and the Rule of Law 
 In the liberal m arket paradigm, the interest of the state is in protecting freedom  and the 
rule of law. As applied to the em ployment relationship, the law’s role is  to promote and protect 
the operation of free markets with voluntary exchange between companies, investors, consumers, 
and workers. In the United States, this view  manifests itself in an  emphasis on comm on law 
principles that support econom ic transactions, especially well-defined property rights, liberty of 
contract, and the law of torts to protect against property damage (Posner, 1986). As captured by a 
report from the Bush administration: 
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By providing a legal f oundation for tran sactions, the governm ent makes the 
market system reliable: it gives people ce rtainty about what they can trade and 
keep, and it allows people to establish terms of trade that will be honored by both 
sellers and buyers. The absence of a ny one of these elem ents—competition, 
enforceable property rights,  or an abil ity to form  mutually adv antageous 
contracts—can result in in efficiency and lower livi ng standards (Council of  
Economic Advisors, 2004: 149). 
 
Equitable Outcomes 
 In pluralist political thought, the state responds to the power of competing interest groups 
and, in the variant m ost relevant here, enforces existing rules wh ile also ensuring fair outcom es 
(Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987; Faulks, 1999). An altern ative vision of the stat e’s interest in the 
employment relationship is ther efore the promotion of equitabl e outcomes. As articu lated by 
Sidney and Beatrice W ebb, two of t he founders of industrial relations, the state m ust balance 
various interests:  
…industrial administration is, in the dem ocratic state, a more complicated matter 
than is naively imagined by the old-fashioned capitalist, demanding the “right to 
manage his own business in his own way.” …In the interests of the community as 
a whole, no one of the interm inable series of decisions can be allowed to run 
counter to the consensus of expert opinion representing the consumers on the one 
hand, the producers on the other, and the nation that is param ount over both 
(1897: 821-23). 
 
In contrast to liberal m arket proponents then, in this paradigm  there is greater support for 
government intervention to reduce m arket imperfections (such as unem ployment), to equalize 
bargaining power between employers and employees through unionization and social safety nets, 
and to provide workers with gr eater voice through works councils. At an international level, 
there is support for the Internat ional Labour Organization and its promotion of labor standards. 
For those that see labor rights as  human rights, the state has the responsibility to guarantee these 
rights. 
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Dominance of the Elite  
A third vie w on the in terests of the state in the em ployment relationship is tha t the 
capitalist state p erpetuates the do minance of th e ruling class. This view is most clearly  
articulated in Marxist thought in which social ch ange is driven by capitalism  rather than the 
behavior of the state so that the state is viewed as an instrument of the capitalists w ho are then 
society’s ruling class (F aulks, 1999; Pierson, 1996) . Even though the state appears to be acting 
autonomously and neutrally, given its role of protect ion of ownership it is in effect intertwined 
with particular economic interests (Hyman, 1975; King, 1986). To wit, Kelly (1998) discusses 
how government repression of strikers and the pr otection of strike replacem ents reduces the 
effectiveness of collective action and thereby favors capital over labor.  
THE (IN)COMPATABILITY OF INTERESTS 
 The framework developed in this chapter a sserts that the ideologies and fram es of 
reference of employment relations are rooted in two key dimensions: the interests of the parties 
to the em ployment relationship and the degree of  compatibility of these inte rests. The 
compatibility or inco mpatibility of interests, in turn, depends on how m arkets and the 
employment relationship work. Now that the in terests have been described, consider four 
different views on the com patibility of these interests and the natu re of the employm ent 
relationship: 
1. Employers and em ployees freely pursue their own self -interest in c ompetitive labor 
markets; when these interests align, they consummate an econom ic transaction, when 
they do not align, they keep searching for mutually-beneficial exchanges. 
2. Although labor m arkets might not be perfect , employers and employees share a unity 
of interests, especially in that tre ating employees well improves the company’s bottom 
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line and vice versa. 
3. Employers and employees interact as unequals with some shared and some conflicting 
interests, but these conflicts are economic in nature  and lim ited to the em ployment 
relationship. 
4. Employers and employees interact as unequals with significant power differentials that 
are pervasive through all social relations. 
These differing views o n the compatibility or incompatibility of the interests of em ployers and 
employees, as possibly shaped, mediated, or reflected by the interests of the state, define the four 
theories that underlie the essen tial ideologies and fram es of reference for m ost employment 
relations scholars, policy makers, and practitioners—t he egoist, unitarist, pl uralist, and critical 
employment relationships (see Table 5.1). 
The Egoist Employment Relationship 
 The egoist employment relationship is rooted in the pursuit of individual self-interest by 
rational agents in econ omic markets. Labor is conceptualized as a co mmodity like any o ther 
productive resource. Employees are seen as inte rested in incom e while firm s pursue profit  
maximization. The state prom otes economic transactions through protecting property rights and 
enforcing contracts. As such, there isn’t a co nflict between e mployers and e mployees; rather, 
they simply engage in voluntar y, mutually-beneficial transactions to buy and sell units of 
productive labor based on the what the m arket will bear. Wages are never too lo w or too high,  
they simply reflect each worker’s productive co ntributions. If workers and employers are equal 
in terms of econom ic power, legal expertise a nd protections, and political influence, then 
neoclassical economic theory shows that abus es and exploitation are prevented by perfect 
competition in the labor market. 
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 Employment-at-will—that is, the right to hire and fire, or take a job and quit, at anytim e 
for any reason—is a key feature of the egoi st employment relationship. Employers and  
employees should be able to enter into an y explicit or im plicit agreement involving any 
mutually-agreeable terms and conditions  of employment, including compensation, hours, 
duration of employment, job duties, and the like. In the interest s of both economic optimization 
and individual freedom, e mployers and em ployees should likewise be able to end thes e 
arrangements when conditions o r preferences change, or if a better deal com es along (Epstein, 
1984). Labor unions and governm ent-mandated labor standards are seen as interfering with the 
invisible hand of the free m arket and distort em ployment and output levels throughout the 
economic system (Reynolds, 1984). Unions are also seen as interfer ing with the discipline of the 
market by protecting lazy workers. Note carefu lly that the ego ist employment relationship 
critically depends on embracing a value system in  which efficiency is  the primary objective of 
the employment relationship and whatever the market bears is best. 
The three rem aining theories p lace less em phasis on m arket determinism; markets are 
seen as useful for allocating scarce resources to productive uses, but as also imperfect because of 
information problems, mobility an d transactions costs, un equal access to f inancial and leg al 
resources, the importance of behavioral concerns such as fairness or social pressure in individual  
decision-making, and other real-world com plications (Manning, 2003). The three rem aining 
theories are also  rooted in a d ifferent set of values (based on em bracing different em ployee 
interests), especially in that workers are seen as hum an beings with psychological and physical 
needs and aspirations, and in the last two theories, with moral worth and democratic rights, too. 
The Unitarist Employment Relationship 
 The second theory em braces a unitarist view of the em ployment relationship—the right 
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employment policies and practices will align th e interests of employers and employees (Bacon, 
2003; Fox, 1974; Lewin, 2001). In other words, labor and management have a unity of interests; 
any conflict in practice stems from poor employment practices. This frame of reference underlies 
contemporary human resource managem ent which focuses on crea ting policies that 
simultaneously benefit employers (through their in terest in profit m aximization) and employees 
(through their interest in fulfillment) (Pfeffer, 1998; Ulrich and Brockbank, 2005).  
In practice, there are a num ber of variants of the hum an resource management model 
ranging from hierarchical, paternalistic approaches to high-comm itment approaches to strategic 
approaches (Applebaum and Batt, 1994; Katz and Darbishire, 2000). The underlying comm on 
denominator, however, is the attempt to devise human resources policies that are seen as aligning 
the interests of em ployees and employers. Some common examples include valid and reliable 
selection measures to hire and promote employees; training and development opportunities; 
respectful methods of supervision; com pensation that provides more than a living wage while 
also rewarding performance; benef its that fo ster personal growth, security, and work-life 
balance; and informal or formal dispute resolution procedures.5 As reflected by the emphasis on 
employees’ interest in fulfillment, psychology is arguably the dominant disciplinary influence in 
the unitarist camp.   
The unitarist em phasis is generally on indi vidual rather than colle ctive identities, 
behaviors, and practices. In f act, in the unitarist em ployment relationship, labor unions and 
government-mandated labor standards are unnece ssary. If companies are following the hum an 
resource management school’s ideas of effective management, then workers will be satisfied and 
                                                 
5 So-called low road strategies rooted in low wages and managerial control are better captured by 
the egoist theory of the employment relationship in that they are rooted in a narrow conception of 
employee interests and in an emphasis on what the labor market will bear. 
 5-23
will not support a union  nor need mandated lab or standards. Such institutions ar e also largely 
seen as unnecessary because the unitarist v iew emphasizes fulfillment and intrinsic rewards. The 
role of the state is limited—while some scholars advocate government policies to promote high-
performance work practices (e.g., Levine, 1995), hu man resources professionals are more likely 
to lobby against rather than for additional regul ation; instead, the state’s role is seen as 
promoting the rule of law and econom ic transactions because this serves organization al 
performance. As with the other theories, this perspective is roo ted in specific values and 
assumptions pertaining to the interests of the em ployment relationship and the nature of conflict 
within this relationship, and is  often used as an im portant ideology and frame of reference by 
employment relations actors.  
The Pluralist Employment Relationship 
The pluralist employment relationship consists of workers and em ployers bargaining in 
imperfect labor m arkets in the p resence of pluralist conflict—that is, in an em ployment 
relationship consisting of multiple, sometimes-conflicting interests (employers might want lower 
labor costs, flexibility, and an intens e pace of work while employees might want h igher wages, 
employment security, and a safe work environm ent) as well as shared  interests (such as quality 
products, productive workers, and profitable companies) (Clegg, 1975; Fox, 1974).  
The pluralist view of conflict is intim ately related to a belief that labor m arkets are not 
perfectly competitive. Sidney an d Beatrice Webb, John R. Commons, and other early 
institutionalists attributed the exploitive Angl o-American employment conditions of the early 
twentieth century to the superior power of large corporations over individual em ployees 
(Kaufman, 1997). This power advantage was believed to be rooted in market imperfections such 
as isolated company towns, mobility costs, lack of family savings or other resources, segmented 
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markets, and excess labor supply. Moreover, a core pluralist value is the re jection that labor is 
simply a commodity (Kaufman, 2005) and therefore that labor is enti tled to equity and voice in 
the employment relationship (Budd, 2004). As such, th e role of the state is  to promote equitable 
outcomes. Because inequitable outcomes are seen as stemming from imperfect labor markets and 
unequal bargaining power, unions and m andated labor standards are viewed as m echanisms for 
leveling the playing field between em ployers and employees thereby prom oting the optim al 
operation of markets rather than interfering with it (as predicted by theories rooted in competitive 
markets). Also, because of the belief that there are at least som e conflicts of interes ts, the 
pluralist industrial relations sc hool rejects the unitari st reliance on corporate self-interest and 
goodwill to protect workers. Rath er, labor un ions are seen as a productive coun terweight to 
corporate power; social insura nce and m andated minimum standards also help protect all 
workers against the vagaries of the business cycle and corporate power.   
The Critical Employment Relationship 
 The critical e mployment relationship is r ooted in the power and control interests of 
employers and employees and therefore sees the employment relationship as a struggle for power 
and control (Gall, 2003; Hym an, 1975, 2006). The sc hools of thought subscribing to this fra me 
of reference can be grouped t ogether under the um brella of cr itical industrial relations and 
encompass Marxist, feminist, and other sociological theories based on the division and control of 
labor. While sharing the view that labor is more than just a commodity, unlike the pluralist view 
in which employer-em ployee conflict is confined to the em ployment relationship, the critical 
perspective is that em ployment relations conflict is part of a broader societal clash between 
competing groups (Kelly, 1998). A Marxist pe rspective assumes that employer-employee 
conflict is o ne element of unequal power rela tions between the capitalist and work ing classes 
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throughout society. A feminist perspective focuses on unequal power relations between m en and 
women; a critical race perspective emphasizes segr egation and control along racial lines (Am ott 
and Matthaei, 1996; Delgado and Stefancic, 2001; Gottfried, 2006; Greene, 2003; Lustig, 2004).  
 In the critical employment relationship, the labor market is not seen as a neutral forum for 
matching self-interested workers with se lf-interested firms (as in the ego ist employment 
relationship); rather it is seen as a socially -based instrument of power and control (Hym an, 
1975). The em ployment relationship is therefore not a voluntary exchange but rather is a  
contested exchange (Bowles and Gintis, 1990). Because of the socially-rooted, ongoing conflict 
between labor and capital, hum an resource management practices are not seen as m ethods for 
aligning worker and em ployer interests, but rather as disguised rh etoric that quietly underm ines 
labor power and perpetuates the dom inance of capital (L egge, 1995). Strong, militant labor 
unions are seen as im portant advocates for work ers’ interests in th e workplace and in the 
political arena. But ultim ately, relying on collectiv e bargaining to advance workers’ interests is 
inadequate because of the stru ctural inequalities that perv ade the workplace and the greate r 
socio-political context. That conflict between competing groups is not limited to the employment 
relationship also means that the state is largely concerned with perpetuating the dominance of the 
powerful group, whether it be capit alists, men, or a dom inant ethnic group. As with the other 
theories, the key to understanding the critical em ployment relationship is through an analysis of 
the interests of the e mployment relations actors paired with an understanding of how the parties 
interact and the extent to which the various interests are compatible.  
FROM THEORY TO IDEOLOGY AND FRAME OF REFERENCE 
 Ideologies and fram es of reference rela ted to work and e mployment relations are 
pervasive, from portrayals of labor in the pain tings of Victorian England to the coverage of 
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contemporary events in the m ainstream media (Barringer, 2005; Martin, 2004). Under Mao, the 
authoritarian communist regime in China until the la te 1970s emphasized unitarist employment 
themes because communism  is supposed to resolv e the conflicts of inte rest believed to be 
inherent in capitalism (Taylor, et al., 2003). In  the Western workplace, business executives and 
managers use ideology to legitim atize employment practices (Anthony, 1977; Bendix, 1956; 
Kunda and Ailon-Souday, 2005); unions and workers use ideology to justify their ow n behaviors 
and actions. The various actors use their fram es of reference to evalu ate the ideo logies and 
actions of others. When another’s ideology is unconvincing (because it is rejected by your frame  
of reference), it is tempting to  dismiss that ideology as hollow rhetoric to support a special 
interest. We believe, however, that it is m ore instructive to see thes e ideologies (and frames of 
reference) as rooted in the four theories of th e employment relationship. Depending on the 
application, all four theories can  serve as an ideology and as a fra me of reference. Many of the 
examples used here f ollow the rest of the lite rature and f ocus on m anagerial ideologies and 
frames of reference, but it again bears em phasizing that all e mployment relations actors have 
ideologies and fram es of reference. This is  implicit in Dunlop’s (1 958) assertion that an 
employment relations system is stable only if the actors share a common ideology. 
 Management discourse currently emphasi zes market ideals (Kunda and Ailon-Souday, 
2005). The ideal corporation is portrayed as a nimble network of e mpowered entrepreneurial 
work groups that focus on core competencies; ex cess layers of m anagement are supposed to be  
downsized; low value added activ ities are supposed to be outs ourced. This ideology is grounded 
in the egoist employment relationship model and its laissez-faire ideals. Scholars that believe the 
values and assumptions that underlie the egoist model and use it as their frame of reference see 
the calls for more flexible business organizations as legitimate and wise. The power  of the four  
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models is in illum inating alternative perspectives. Scholars th at analyze the e mployment 
relationship through a critical frame of reference see this market-based ideology as a mechanism 
of control that causes workers to buy into a syst em that doesn’t serve their interests because 
employer and employee interests are fundamentally opposed.  
 Similarly, unitarist corporate ideologies are seen as valid frames of reference by unitarist 
actors, but are seen as  disguised coercion and union busting by actors who look at hum an 
resources policies through the lenses of pluralist and critical frames of reference. Differing views 
on labor unions—from harmful to unnecessary to beneficial to inadequate—are clearly rooted in 
the four frames of reference presented here (Budd, 2005). Contrasting perspectives on ownership 
and control rights also flow from  these frames of reference. In the egois t model, property rights 
are paramount so a firm ’s owners should have co mplete control rights. In the pluralist m odel, 
stakeholders merit full consideration, and in the critical model, even stakehold er rights are 
insufficient to overcome the struc tural inequalities of capitalism. In advocating such positions, 
the underlying theories are being us ed as ideologies; in evaluating ownership and control rights, 
the underlying theories are being employed as frames of reference. 
 The importance of ideologies and fram es of reference is also apparent in the legal arena. 
In the United States, for exam ple, the Lochner-era Supreme Court in the early 19 00s is well-
known for striking down labor and em ployment laws on the basis that  they interfered with the 
liberty of contract. In the critical frame of reference, the liberty of contract might be viewed as a 
rhetorical justification f or rulings that favored capital, but there is some evidence that judges 
truly believed that liberty of c ontract benefited capital and labor  as in the egois t frame of 
reference (Forbath, 1985). As a second exam ple, Dannin (2006) shows how contemporary U.S. 
judges decide labor law cases us ing common law principles pertai ning to property rights as the 
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basis for their legal analyses. This is consistent with their legal training so it is not surprising that 
it forms the basis of their egoist frame of reference. 
 Empirical work on ideologies and fram es of reference is rare, but a few studies support 
the approach outlined here. In sur veys of U.S. and Canadian em ployment relations scholars, 
Godard (1992, 1995) finds that significant fractions of scholars use each of our four theories as a 
frame of reference. Mo reover the evaluations of different em ployment relations issues are 
consistent within a frame which supports the co herence of these m odels. Godard (1997) further  
finds that managerial ideologies/frames of reference are an im portant determinant of managerial 
actions pertaining to employment relations. Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986) ascribe the rise 
of the nonunion em ployment relationship in the United States larg ely to managerial frames of 
reference. Poole et al. (2005) find that the attit udes of British m anagers are linked to broader 
political and economic trends while Barley and Kunda (1992) pres ent qualitative evidence that 
U.S. managerial ideologies differ between ec onomic expansions and contractions. There are 
likely many other complex factors that determ ine what ideology is dom inant, how ideology 
shapes frames of reference and values, and m any other important questions. There is therefore a 
need for more research on the dynam ics of ideologies and frames of reference. For employment 
relations, the starting point is the four theories presented here. 
CONCLUSION: VALUES AT WORK 
 The chapter presents f our theories as a starting point for understanding the major 
perspectives within the study and practice of employment relations. When these theories are used 
to analyze em ployment relations and to determ ine one’s actions, they becom e the four key  
frames of reference in employm ent relations. When these th eories are employed to advocate a 
certain viewpoint, they becom e the central ideo logies in the field. Distinguishing between 
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ideologies and frames of reference allows us to  readily analyze situations in which som e actors 
express one view but other actors see those acti ons differently. Union leaders m ay express an 
ideology of employee voice and ba lancing interests; employers may see this in their frame of 
reference as rhetoric covering up the union’s selfish pursuit of better wages for union members at 
the expense of others. Rooting these ideologies a nd frames of reference in four theories of the 
employment relationship allows us to readily appreciate where these differing id eologies and 
frames of reference are com ing from. Continuing w ith the previous example, the union leader’s 
ideology might be rooted in a pluralist m odel whereas the employer’s fram e of reference is an 
egoist or unitarist model.  
 The postmodern em phasis on discourse un derscores the im portance of explicitly 
recognizing the power of language in the world of work (Burrell, 2006; Hearn and Michelson, 
2006). By rooting the analysis of employment relations ideologies and frames of reference in the 
four theories of the employm ent relationship, it becomes apparent that cl ashes in discourse and 
practice between different ideologies or fram es of reference stem  from divergent underlying 
values and assumptions, especially as they pertain to the interests of the parties in the modern 
employment relationship. One of the key values  of e mployment relations outside the egoist 
model is that labor is more than just a commodity (Kaufm an, 2005). In contrast, in the egoist 
model one of the key values is that laissez-fair e market outcomes have particular worth because 
they are produced by voluntary free exchange. These differing values go a long way toward 
explaining divergent ideologies  and fra mes of reference in employm ent relations and 
approaching employment relations in this way reveals these underlying differences.  
 Values and ideologies are defined here  (and elsewhere) with a  large normative 
component—they represent principles and system s that ought to be true. Adherents to the egoist  
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model lobby for the deregulation of the employment relationship. Believers in the unitarist model 
argue that companies should use certain hum an resources practices. Subscribers to the pluralist 
theory support public policy reforms that make it easier for workers to unionize. Adherents to the 
critical school seek more fundamental changes in ownership and control rights. But at the sam e 
time, it is essential to re cognize the theoretical or analytical aspects that are rooted in the values 
and assumptions of employm ent relations. The egoist model predicts that m arket-based 
relationships maximize welfare. The unitarist model implies that providing opportunities for 
individual fulfillment boosts em ployee productivity. The pluralist model hypothesizes that 
unions can improve productivity. The critical model predicts that managers will pursue strategies 
that increase their control in the workplace. Contrary to  the characterization of even som e 
employment relations scholars (e.g., Kochan, 1998) , values do not comprise just the norm ative 
foundations of the field; rather , values and assumptions under lie views on how the employm ent 
relationship works analytically as much as how it should work norm atively (Budd, Gomez, and 
Meltz, 2004). 
 On both a normative and positive level, as the support for various values and assumptions 
wax and wane, the four ideologies and fra mes of reference exhibit an u neven trajectory during 
the development of the field and p ractice of Anglo-American employment relations (Ackers and 
Wilkinson, 2005; Kaufm an, 1993; 2004). The egoist  employment relationship was fir mly 
cemented by the end  of the 19th century  in the United States w ith the deve lopment of the 
employment-at-will doctrine and the rejection of  mandated labor standards on the grounds that it 
interfered with free contrac ting. Cycles of econom ic depressions and widespread sweatshop 
working conditions, however, sparked the developm ent of Marx’s views on work and capitalism 
in the mid-1800s, and the later developm ent of the pluralist model arou nd the turn of the 20th 
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century, and the c reation of the u nitarist model shortly thereafter. The pluralist model was 
embraced on an international scal e with the creation of the Inte rnational Labour Organization at 
the end of World W ar I. During the 1920s, the four m odels competed for dominance, but the 
Great Depression discredited the egoist and unitarist m odels in the United States. During the 
1930s, then, the New Deal policies of the Roosevelt adm inistration were rooted in the pluralist 
model. In Great Britain, the centrality of the pluralist model was reflected in the Donovan Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations  in the 1960s. Fast forward to the 
21st century and we see that with th e rise of the liberal market paradigm, the egoist m odel has 
made a comeback; its ideology is certainly spoken with the loudest voice in popular discourse. In 
spite of ideas for revitalizi ng pluralist (Ackers, 2002; Bud d, 2004) and critical (Kelly, 1998) 
employment relations, the field is in flux as th e pluralist and critical models face significant 
challenges from the egoist and unitarist perspectives (Ackers and W ilkinson, 2003, 2005; 
Kaufman, 2004). 
 With respect to evalua ting corporate policies or shaping public polic y, competition 
among these ideologies and fram es of reference ar e to be expected since—as illustrated here —
the models embrace different visions of the interests of the employment relationship and of their 
compatibility or incom patibility. But as an inte llectual endeavor, the diversity of  employment 
relations is both a strength and a weakness. It is a weakness when adherents of different views 
are isolated and talk p ast each oth er. It is a strength when diverse perspectives can help us  
understand the com plex issues inherent across th e entire spectrum  of the world of work. To 
foster this s trength, competing and  shared values, ideologies, and frames of refer ence must be 
given explicit recognition in our scholarship and discourse. For those new to the field, a true 
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understanding of e mployment relations requires  an appreciation for the diverse values, 
ideologies, and frames of reference in the world of work. 
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 Figure 5.1: Defining Ideology and Frame of Reference 
 
Note: This diagram provides schematic definitions, not a causal model. 
Values 
Theories of the 
Employment 
Relationship 
Behavioral and 
Institutional 
Assumptions 
Justification  / 
Call for Actions 
and Outcomes 
Internal Guide 
for Action and 
Evaluation 
Ideology Frame of 
Reference 
 5-43
Table 5.1: Four Theories of the Employment Relationship 
Theory Employer Interests Employee Interests State Interests Key Beliefs 
Egoist Profit-Maximization Utility-Maximization 
(Survival and Income) 
Freedom 
Rule of Law 
Freedom and individual self-
interest yield optimal 
outcomes through free 
market transactions 
Unitarist Profit-Maximization Fulfillment Freedom 
Rule of Law 
Corporate policies can align 
the interests of employers 
and employees 
Pluralist  Profit-Maximization 
or Stakeholder Value 
Equity 
Voice 
Equitable Outcomes Optimal outcomes are 
achieved when there is a 
balance between employer 
and employee interests 
Critical     
Political Economy Power and Control Power and Control Dominance of the Elite Capital dominates labor in 
the employment relationship 
and in broader societal 
institutions 
Feminist Power and Control  Power and Control Dominance of the Elite Male concerns dominate 
female concerns in the 
employment relationship and 
in broader societal 
institutions 
Race Power and Control  Power and Control Dominance of the Elite Concerns of one ethnic group 
dominate other group’s 
concerns in the employment 
relationship and in broader 
societal institutions 
 
